38w ago - Following up on his previous release, today Sony PlayStation 3 hacker Naehrwert has updated SCETool to version 0.2.9 which now includes an NP application types fix and more as detailed in the changes below.
Plaintext sections will now take less space in metadata header keys array.
Added option to specifiy a template SELF to take configuration values from.
Added option to override the keyset used for en-/decryption.
Fixed NP application types.
[Firmware Version] will now be written to control info only.
[Application Version] will now be written to application info only.
Finally, from ben.ss7: Here is a scetool v0.2.9 which has zlib1.dll and the data folder embedded within the exe, which means it doesn't require you to have zlib1.dll and the data folder for keys.
The original scetool source code hasn't been touched and it shouldn't have any issues. The keys which have been embedded in to this exe are:
If any user wants me to embed all the keys up to 4.31 PM me. Enjoy
Stay tuned for more PS3 Hacks and PS3 CFW news, follow us on Twitter and be sure to drop by the PS3 Hacks and PS3 Custom Firmware Forums for the latest PlayStation 3 scene updates and homebrew releases!
Following up on his PS3 SCETool update and PS3 Dump_Rootkey code, today Sony PlayStation 3 hacker Naehrwert has posted some details on exploiting the PlayStation 3 lv2_kernel and has made available a sample 3.41 implementation below.
To quote from his blog: Exploiting (?) lv2
A long while ago KaKaRoTo pointed me to a stack overflow he found while reversing lv2_kernel. But there are two problems:
1. The vulnerability is in a protected syscall (the SELF calling it got to have the 0x40... control flags set). So you’d first need to find a suitable usermode exploit (don’t ask us), that gives you code execution with the right privileges.
2. The payload data is copied to lv2 heap first and the function will do a free call on it before the payload has any chance to get executed. This might not sound like a problem but it looks like lv2′s heap implementation will overwrite the free’ed space with 0xABADCAFE and thus destroy the payload.
Here (pastie.org/4755699) is my sample implementation for 3.41 lv2_kernel (although the vulnerability should be present in all versions of lv2 up to the latest firmware), maybe someone of you will find a way to overcome problem (2.) and can get something nice out of it because right now it’s only good to crash lv2.
* lv2 sys_mount stack overflow
* Original finder: KaKaRoTo (thank you for pointing it out!)
* Note: all offsets/values/addrs in this source are 3.41 specific
printf(" Taking the plunge...\n");
s64 res = sys_mount("FOO", "BAR", "XXX", 0, 0, 0, list, LIST_LENGTH);
printf(" Error: sys_mount returned (res = 0x%016lX).\n", (u64)res);
From Mathieulh (via pastebin.com/naxXkv3M):
Sep 04 13:16:42 I just posted one last thing
Sep 04 13:17:05 I dislike being called "king of liars" especially by someone who doesn't understand sht about ps3 self crypto
Sep 04 13:17:25 and yeah I said the truth
Sep 04 13:17:31 this footer signature
Sep 04 13:17:33 is not checked
Sep 04 13:17:35 even in 4.21
Sep 04 13:17:37 go figure
Sep 04 13:17:44 at least not upon npdrm self execution
Sep 04 13:17:59 I believe it is checked while the packages install
Sep 04 13:18:03 but that's something else
Sep 04 13:18:31 I don't even think it was called on 3.55 at all, (the function that does the stuff)
Sep 04 13:18:33 that's also wrong info
Sep 04 13:18:35 I gave kakaroto
Sep 04 13:18:40 over a week of work
Sep 04 13:18:48 with everything one would want to know
Sep 04 13:18:52 about self format
Sep 04 13:19:16 but he called it "useless" without revealing what I gave him
Sep 04 13:19:31 and he claimed how all of this was already public when most wasn't
Sep 04 13:19:47 he did all this along with his pamphlet in order to hide his incompetence
Sep 04 13:20:04 as he was "begging" me (literally) to get the extra info he needed to get his hack to work
Sep 04 13:20:09 and I told him to figure the rest himself
Sep 04 13:20:12 and he never could
Sep 04 13:20:19 figures
Sep 04 13:20:34 zecoxao, I gave him something he needed
Sep 04 13:20:42 but he wanted me to supply ALL the work
Sep 04 13:20:48 and I wasn't ok with that
Sep 04 13:20:58 the more I gave him
Sep 04 13:21:00 the more he asked
Sep 04 13:21:32 but yeah
Sep 04 13:22:03 if you can actually resign lv0, and put your own keyset in appldr on 4.21
Sep 04 13:22:16 and set your own keyset to something higher than 0x0D
Sep 04 13:22:35 and build a complying npdrm that has all the new values appldr checks, WITHOUT the so called footer
Sep 04 13:22:37 and run it
Sep 04 13:22:41 it runs just fine...
Sep 04 13:22:51 (yes, I did test this)
Sep 04 13:23:18 they do whitelist anything older than keyset 0x0D now for npdrm too
Sep 04 13:23:32 so crafting npdrms for 4.21 would not work on ofw now
Sep 04 13:23:38 but that stupid footer
Sep 04 13:23:47 which he claims is why whatever I told him was BS
Sep 04 13:23:54 is STILL NOT CHECKED
Sep 04 13:24:22 Kraparoto banned me from all the chans he is op as soon as I exposed him
Sep 04 13:24:27 how mature of him eh ?
Sep 04 13:25:22 so not only he is an incompetent whining kid, but he also totally lacks maturity
Sep 04 13:25:28 so I am done with the stupid drama
Sep 04 13:25:32 or talking to him
The footer signature is still not checked upon npdrm self files execution as of 4.21.
Because kakaroto says something that doesn't make it true. Basically he found a check in 3.55 that was not even called and assumed they used it in 3.60+.
Of course they do whitelist npdrm now so even if the footer isn't checked you cannot run your own npdrm selfs signed with keyset lower than 0x0D making the whole debate rather pointless. Aditional checks are now performed on the actual file format as well such as the segment counter flag that needs to be set to 0x01 except for the very last segment.
Finally, from KDSBest (via twitlonger.com/show/jcmh80): Since naehrwert posted an lv2 exploit I will do so too . The stack pointer points to lv2 and if we do a syscall, the syscall saves register to the stack HAHA.
Btw. It just crashes the console for now, since I totally overwrite dump the lv2 or some memory addresses I don't know. Feel free to try around, adjust the address of the stackpointer and so on. If you managed to get the panic payload executed. Tell me!!! ^^
register unsigned long long payloadHolder2 asm ("r21");
register unsigned long long payloadHolder asm ("r20");
register unsigned long long stackpointer asm ("r1");
register unsigned long long counter asm ("r25");
register unsigned long long bufferStackpointer asm ("r26");
// Play with that address till the panic is executed, I lack of time todo so
// add always 2 or 4 to it, i would try 4 or 8... bla bla you will get the idea
stackpointer = 0x8000000000000100UL;
// KDSBest Payload
// Prepare for our Syscall