PS3 IDPS Viewer Tool Homebrew Application is Released

62w ago - It's been awhile since the last IDPS update, and today I've created this PS3 IDPS Viewer homebrew application based on research I'm doing and had not planned to release the tool out yet, but if someone needs it here it is (Thanks to J-Martin for the logo).

Download: PS3 IDPS Viewer Homebrew Application / PS3 IDPS Viewer Homebrew Application (USB)

What does this tool?

• Displays the IDPS
  
• Shows Target ID
  
• Displays Motherboard revision
  
• Save your IDPS in IDPS.bin file
  

Note: THIS TOOL IS SAFE

When the program starts you will see the typical intro screen, if you choose "Yes" you will see the data from your PS3, if sounds three beeps indicates that it was not possible dump and show the error message, and if all went well sounds a beep and you are able to see the data.

Automatically saves the IDPS in dev_hdd0/IDPS.bin, you must open it with a hex editor and look hexadecimal values, for example (IDPS false, I will not reveal my IDPS):

e.g Notepad
Hex EditorThe IDPS in this case would be: 00 00 00 01 00 85 00 May 87 47 64 15 A4 F6 4D AA

It has been tested on PS3 FAT, SLIM should work perfectly in also.

Regards

Finally, in related news PlayStation 3 developer naehrwert has recently blogged (nwert.wordpress.com/2011/12/24/individual-infos/) about PS3 Individual Infos, to quote:

One of the PS3′s console specific cryptography works as follows:

At factory time there is a console specific key generated, probably from a private constant value and a console specific seed. Maybe that’s the key used for encrypting bootldr and metldr. Fact is, that metldr stores another console specific keyset (key/iv) to LS offset 0x00000.

That keyset is probably calculated from the first one. At factory time the isolated root keyset (how I call it) is used to encrypt the console’s “Individual Infos”, like eEID. But not the whole eEID is encrypted the same way, special seeds are used to calculate key/iv pairs for the different sections.

And not even that is true for every eEID section, because for e.g. EID0 another step is needed to generate the final section key(set). Each of the isolated modules using such an “Individual Info” has a special section that isoldr uses to generate the derived key(set)s.

But the generation works in a way, that the section data is encrypted with aes-cbc using the isolated root keyset, so it is not possible to calculate the isolated root keyset back from the derived key(set)s, because aes shouldn’t allow a known plaintext attack.

So far I can decrypt some of EID0′s sections, EID1, EID2 and EID4. EID5 encryption should be similar to EID0′s but I lack the generation keys for that one.