Resistance: FoM Network Update Vulnerability
For example, using the Warhawk hole users could change directories, in the R:FOM one you can't. In layman's terms, it means this R:FOM method is even more limited/useless than the Warhawk one was. Of course to those who just recently discovered it- this is being incorrectly labeled as something useful when it sadly isn't at all.
However, since Sony plugged the Warhawk hole in a past Firmware Update, most of the devs opted to keep quiet until tonight... as now this hole will certainly be addressed in an upcoming Firmware Update as it is indeed a security issue to Sony.
It's a fairly simple method. Using your favorite DNS "hijack" method, or proxy server redirect download-prod.online.scea.com to a HTTP server.
On the HTTP server, set up the path:
/client-patch/resistancegs-prod/resistancegs_SCEE/8.7.1.1/
So, http://download-prod.online.scea.com/client-
patch/resistancegs-prod/resistancegs_SCEE/8.7.1.1/ will be redirected to your HTTP server.
You will want to download the files from there to your HTTP server, and recreate the file directory. You can then begin to play around with the files.
http://download-prod.online.scea.com/client-patch/resistancegs-
prod/resistancegs_SCEE/8.7.1.1/manifest.dat
http://download-prod.online.scea.com/client-patch/resistancegs-
prod/resistancegs_SCEE/8.7.1.1/EBOOT.BIN
Note: You may need to change _SCEE to _SCEA, depending on your region.
You cant do much with this, you can replace some files, but since they're all encrypted and signed, its somewhat useless indeed!
In regards to the Manifest.dat, a hint:
0x00: 0x49470001 - marker
0x04: 0x0000000a - number of files
0x08: 32 bytes per patch file
And the patch files:
0x00: 64-bit length
0x08: 32-bit checksum? (unused)
0x0c: 20 bytes - zero terminated file name
